Climate Change and the Clean Air Act
By

LISA HEINZERLING*

Author's Note
AFTER I WROTE THIS ARTICLE, the Supreme Court decided Massachusetts v. EPA' by a vote of 5-4 in favor of Massachusetts and other
petitioners. 2 The Court accepted both of the arguments made in this
Article (which had themselves formed the centerpiece of the briefs I3
wrote on behalf of petitioners in that case): (1) that the Clean Air Act
("Act" or "CAA") authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA" or "the agency") to regulate greenhouse gases from motor vehicles and (2) that EPA erred in refusing to regulate these emissions
based on policy concerns not reflected in the Act.
On the first issue, the Court held that greenhouse gases are "air
pollutants" subject to regulation under the Act. 4 The Court focused
on the statutory text and proclaimed it "unambiguous. ' 5 The Court
found that legislation enacted after the relevant provisions of the Act
were passed did not impinge upon EPA's pre-existing authority to regulate air pollutants and that nothing in the Court's decision in FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.6 (invalidating the Food and Drug

Administration's ("FDA") regulation of tobacco products) justified a
narrow interpretation of the Act. 7 The Court also concluded that regulation under the Act was not inconsistent with the Department of
8
Transportation's responsibility to set standards for fuel efficiency.
More generally, the Court observed that the Act's broad language deProfessor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This article draws heavily on
petitioners' briefs in Massachusetts v. EPA. I was the primary author of those briefs. I am
grateful tojustin Wade, Susannah Foster, Meghan Greenfield, andJessica Galante for their
fabulous research assistance on the briefs.
1. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
2. Id.
7 7
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401- 6 1q (2000).
4. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1459.
5. Id. at 1460.
6. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
7. 127 S. Ct. at 1461.
8. Id. at 1461-62.
*
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fining "air pollutants" reflected "an intentional effort to confer the
flexibility necessary to forestall . . . obsolescence" in the presence of

"changing circumstances and scientific developments." 9
On the issue of agency discretion, the Court rejected arguments
that EPA's refusal to regulate greenhouse gases was unreviewable
agency inaction. 10 Instead, the Court found that EPA erred by citing a
"laundry list" of reasons why it preferred not to regulate, rather than
grounding its decision in the statutory criterion of endangerment of
public health and welfare.1 1 Even if the agency found the science of
climate change uncertain, the Court held, it could not refuse to regulate greenhouse gases unless the science was so profoundly uncertain
that the agency could not even form a judgment as to whether greenhouse gases were endangering public health or welfare. 12 "The statutory question," the Court said, "is whether sufficient information exists
13
to make an endangerment finding."'

Introduction
In Massachusetts v. EPA, petitioners-twelve states, three cities, an
American territory, and numerous health and environmental
groups-have asked the Supreme Court to hold that the Clean Air Act
gives EPA the power to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor
vehicles and that EPA may not decline to exercise this power based on
statutorily irrelevant factors. 14 The problem petitioners ultimately
seek to address-climate change-is unique in its scope and complexity. But the legal issues before the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA are
neither particularly grand nor particularly complex. They are the
kinds of statutory and administrative law issues courts address every
day in this country without great trouble or fanfare. My aim in this
Article is to show that a standard approach to the legal issues raised in
Massachusetts v. EPA dictates a ruling in petitioners' favor.
Part I gives the background of the case before the Court. Part II
argues that a straightforward reading of the relevant provisions of the
Clean Air Act shows that EPA has the authority to regulate greenhouse gases. Part III explains why EPA does not have the power to
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at
at
at

1462.
1459.
1462.
1463.

at 1446.
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decline to regulate based on statutorily irrelevant concerns. Part IV
briefly concludes. 15

I.

Background

In 1999, the International Center for Technology Assessment and
other parties petitioned EPA to set standards for four chemicals emitted by new motor vehicles: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,
and hydrofluorocarbons.' 6 The petition asserted that, due to effects
on climate, motor vehicles emitting these chemicals cause or contribute to "air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare" within the meaning of section 202(a) (1) of
the Clean Air Act. 17

In 2001, EPA requested public comment on the petition.18 The
agency received nearly 50,000 public comments. 19 In 2003, EPA denied the petition. 20 In explaining its decision, the agency announced,
first, that the Clean Air Act "does not authorize regulation to address
global climate change" 2 1 and that therefore, air pollutants associated
with climate change "are not air pollutants under the [Act's] regulatory provisions." 22 EPA adopted the legal conclusions set forth in a
memorandum written by Robert E. Fabricant, then EPA's General
Counsel, reversing the legal conclusions reached by two previous Gen23
eral Counsels.
15. I discuss only statutory questions in this Article. In addition to taking issue with
petitioners' statutory arguments, respondents in the case have also argued that petitioners
lack standing to challenge EPA's refusal to regulate greenhouse gases. See, e.g., Brief for the
Federal Respondent at 10-20, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120),
2006 WL 3043970, at *10-20 [hereinafter U.S. Brief]. Regardless of how the Court ultimately rules on the question of standing, the statutory issues discussed in this Article will
remain timely and important. A federal district judge in California, for example, has ruled
that the statutory issues in Massachusetts v. EPA are closely intertwined with the question of
whether California's own law regulating greenhouse gases from motor vehicles is preempted by federal law. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, No. 04-6663, slip op. at
3, 6, 2007 WL 135688 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2007).
16. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,922-23 (Sept. 8, 2003).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000) (section 202 is the bill section number; section
7521 is the U.S.C. section number).
18. Control of Emissions from New and In-Use Highway Vehicles and 'Engines, 66
Fed. Reg. 7486, 7486 (Jan. 23, 2001).
19. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,924.
20. Id. at 52,922.
21. Id. at 52,925.
22. Id. at 52,928.
23. Id. at 52,925.
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In offering this interpretation of the term "air pollutant," EPA
turned away from the language of the statutory provisions in question
and instead relied on failed legislative proposals to address climate
change, statutory provisions (in the Clean Air Act and elsewhere) addressing climate change in what the agency called a "nonregulatory"
fashion, and an asserted tension between regulation of air pollutants
associated with climate change and the regulatory structure of the
Clean Air Act and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.24 Citing
the "economic and political significance" of the issue of climate
change, EPA stated that it was "urged on"25 in its legal judgment by
the Supreme Court's decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.
As a separate basis for its decision-discussed in a section entitled
"Different Policy Approach"-EPA stated that it "disagrees with the
regulatory approach urged by petitioners" and that it would not be
"effective or appropriate for EPA to establish GHG [greenhouse gas]
standards for motor vehicles at this time."12 6 In place of the regulatory
program created by section 202 of the Clean Air Act, EPA offered
"near-term voluntary actions and incentives" and "programs aimed at
reducing scientific uncertainties and encouraging technological
27
development."
EPA preferred a "different policy approach" for several reasons.
First, noting that "[t]he science of climate change is extraordinarily
complex and still evolving," 28 the agency trotted through a list of scientific issues that remain inconclusively resolved. 29 EPA relied primarily on selective quotations from a 2001 report by the National
Research Council,3 0 disregarding, among many others, that report's
important opening sentence: "Greenhouse gases are accumulating in
Earth's atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing surface air
3 1
temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise.
Second, EPA concluded that regulation under section 202 was
not warranted because it would "result in an inefficient, piecemeal
24. Id. at 52,925-29.
25. Id. at 52,928.
26. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,929-30.
27. Id. at 52,930.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY
QUESTIONS 1 (2001), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10139.html.
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approach to addressing the climate change issue," since motor vehicles are one of many sources of air pollutants associated with climate
32
change.
Third, EPA asserted that "[u]nilateral EPA regulation" on this
matter could "weaken U.S. efforts to persuade key developing countries to reduce the GHG intensity of their economies. '3 3 Regulation
of air pollutants associated with climate change "raises important foreign policy issues," EPA observed, which it is "the President's preroga34
tive" to address.
Finally, EPA expressed uncertainty about the availability of tech35
nologies to address the emissions at issue.
"In light of [these] considerations," EPA announced, the agency
"would decline the petitioners' request to regulate motor vehicle
GHG emissions even if it had authority to promulgate such
36

regulations."

Petitioners sought review of EPA's decision in the D.C. Circuit.
The appeals court panel split three ways. Judge Randolph authored
the court's lead opinion and announced its judgment.3 7 Assuming
without deciding that the EPA Administrator had authority to regulate
air pollutants associated with climate change, Judge Randolph voted
to uphold the agency's decision based on its "'policy' considerations." 38 Judge Randolph found that section 202(a) (1)'s reference to

the Administrator's 'judgment" gave the agency broad enough discretion to make a decision based on "the sort of policy judgments Congress makes when it decides whether to enact legislation regulating a
particular area. '3 9 These considerations included, but were not limited to, the existence of scientific uncertainty. 40 "It is ... not accurate
to say ... that the EPA Administrator's refusal to regulate rested en,,."41
Judge Randolph concluded that
tirely on scientific uncertainty .

section 202(a) (1) "does not require the Administrator to exercise his
discretion solely on the basis of his assessment of scientific evi32.
52,931.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
(2007).
38.
39.
40.
41.

Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reu'd, 127 S. Ct. 1438
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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dence. ''4 2 According to Judge Randolph, other "'policy' considera-

tions"-concerns about piecemeal regulation, effects on international
treaty negotiations, and technological feasibility, as well as a preference for alternative voluntary approaches-were all factors that the
43
agency was entitled to consider in coming to a decision.
Judge Sentelle dissented in part, but concurred in the judgment. 44 Because what he called the "phenomenon known as 'global
warming"' was "harmful to humanity at large," Judge Sentelle thought
it was "impossible" to establish standing to adjudicate petitioners' legal claims; the grievance was too generalized. 45 He nevertheless joined
in Judge Randolph's judgment denying the petitions for review on the
46
merits to ensure that a majority supported the denial of the petition.
Judge Tatel dissented. The only panel member to reach the question of EPA's authority, Judge Tatel concluded that EPA plainly had
statutory authority to regulate air pollutants associated with climate
change and that its decision not to regulate these pollutants rested on
policy considerations that fell outside the range of discretion dele47
gated by Congress.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the questions whether
EPA had authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air
Act and whether it could decline to exercise that authority based on
policy considerations not enumerated in the statute. 48 The Court did
not answer the Solicitor General's request that it add the issue of
49
standing to the list of questions presented.
II.

Authority

EPA's first legal error was to conclude that physical and chemical
compounds associated with climate change and emitted into the ambient air by motor vehicles are not "air pollutants" within the meaning
of the Clean Air Act, and thus EPA may not regulate them under section 202(a) (1) of the Act. As set forth below, none of the arguments
of EPA or the industry respondents supporting EPA has merit.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 59 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment).
45. Id. at 60.
46. Id. at 60-61.
47. Id. at 61-82 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
48. Massachusetts v. EPA, 126 S. Ct. 2960 (2006).
49. Brief for the Federal Government in Opposition at (1), Massachusetts v. EPA, 127
S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120), available at www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2005/Oresponses/
2005-1120.resp.html.
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The Statutory Text

The argument that EPA has authority to regulate greenhouse
gases under the Clean Air Act rests on a straightforward interpretation
of the statute's text. Massachusetts v. EPA involves the specific question
of whether EPA has authority to regulate greenhouse gases emitted by
motor vehicles. 50 Section 202(a) (1) of the Act directs EPA to regulate
"air pollutants]" from motor vehicles when, in the Administrator's
judgment, they "cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 5 1 The
52
Act defines "welfare" to include effects on "climate" and "weather.
Physical or chemical matter that is emitted into the ambient air is an
"air pollutant" under the Act.53 Greenhouse gases are physical and
chemical matter emitted into the ambient air by motor vehicles. EPA
thus has authority over these gases under section 202 (a) (1) of the Act.
EPA took the long way around in coming to the opposite conclusion. In deciding that the Act "does not authorize regulation to address global climate change,"' 54 EPA first decided what the statute
meant and then bent the statutory language to fit the agency's predetermined meaning. Rather than beginning with the language of the
statute, as the Supreme Court's precedents instruct, 55 the agency instead began by describing other alleged "indicia of congressional intent,"56 including the "political significance" of the issue of climate
change. 5 7 Only after the agency had persuaded itself-through means
other than examination of the text of the relevant statutory provisions-that Congress could not have intended the statute to authorize
regulation of air pollutants associated with climate change, did the
agency turn to the language of the statute. This is not the way statutory interpretation is supposed to work.
In concluding that air pollutants associated with climate change
are not "air pollutants" within the meaning of the Act, EPA managed
both to ignore and to distort the plain text of the statute. Section
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
52,922,
55.
(2006);
56.
52,926.
57.

Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1446 (2007).
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
Id. § 7602(h).
Id. § 7602(g).
Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,925 (Sept. 8, 2003).
See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2459
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999).
Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
Id. at 52,928.
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3 0 2(g)

defines the critical term "air pollutant": "The term 'air pollutant' means any air pollution agent or combination of such agents,
including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive (including
source material, special nuclear material, and byproduct material)
substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.

58

Motor vehicles emit the physical and chemical matter carbon diox-

ide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons into the ambient
air.No one involved in Massachusettsv. EPA has ever questioned these
basic facts, which place these chemicals squarely within the ambit of
the statutory definition of "air pollutants."
Closer parsing of the statutory text only bolsters this conclusion.
The use of the word "any" in section 302(g)-not once, but twice:
"any" air pollution agent, "any" physical or chemical substance or matter-bespeaks breadth. As the Supreme Court has explained, "the
word 'any' has an expansive meaning, that is, 'one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.'-

59

EPA's interpretation of the term "air pollutant" is at odds with
section 3 02 (g)'s use of the word "any." EPA asserted that "a substance
does not meet the CAA definition of 'air pollutant' simply because it is a
'physical, chemical, biological, radioactive * * * substance or matter
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.' It must
also be an 'air pollution agent.' "60 To accept EPA's view would be to
rewrite the statutory language, changing it from "any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive ...

substance or matter" to the very differ-

ent phrase "some physical, chemical, biological, radioactive .
substance[s] or matter." But that is not what the statute says.
In addition, EPA's interpretation inverts the meaning of the word
"including." Section 302(g) states, "The term 'air pollutant' means
any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any
6
physical, chemical, biological, radioactive . . . substance or matter." '
In suggesting that some "physical, chemical, biological, radioactive * *
58. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).
59. Dep't ofHous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002) (quoting United
States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)); see also, e.g.,J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer HiBred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001) ("In choosing such expansive terms.., modified
by the comprehensive 'any,' Congress plainly contemplated that the [statutory provision]
would be given wide scope.") (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980)).
60. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,929 n.3 (emphasis added).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 7 602(g) (emphasis added).
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* substance[s] or matter" are not "air pollution agent[s]," 62 EPA implied that the class of "air pollution agents" is smaller than the class of
"physical, chemical, biological, radioactive . . . substance or matter
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air." However,
the use of the word "including" indicates that "air pollution agent" is,
if anything, to be given a more spacious, not more cramped, meaning
than the words that follow it. As the Court has recognized, "To 'include' is to 'contain' or 'comprise as part of a whole.' -63 Thus, an "air
pollution agent" is the "whole" of which "any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive ... substance or matter" is a "part."
Petitioners' reading also gives meaning to the word "agent." Congress chose to include within the category of "air pollutants" not
merely the "substance [s] or matter" that might comprise air pollution,
but also other "agents" of air pollution. 64 These agents could include
phenomena that, unlike "substance[s] or matter," have no mass (including, for example, heat and certain types of ionizing radiation,
such as ultraviolet, gamma, and X-rays). Such phenomena could be
"agents" of air pollution even though they are not "substance[s] or
matter." Thus, far from having a constrictive effect on the phrase following the word "including," the use of the term "air pollution agent"
indicates applications of the Act to phenomena not embraced by the
"including" clause.
The text of the Act also makes clear that including air pollutants
associated with climate change under the statutory rubric of "air pollutants" comports with Congress's legislative aims. The basic purpose of
the Clean Air Act is to protect public health and welfare. 65 Adverse
effects on public health and welfare are the key triggers for regulation
under the Act. 6 6 Here is the Act's definition of "welfare":
62. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,929 n.3.
63. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 89 (2001) (quoting WEBSTER'S
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 609 (rev. ed. 1985)); see also S.D. Warren Co. v. Me.

Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 126 S. Ct. 1843 (2006) (stating that "the term 'discharge' when used
without qualification includes a discharge of a pollutant, and a discharge of pollutants"
held to mean that "discharge" was broader than the terms following "includes"); P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 77 n.7 (1979) (defining "employee" to mean "any person
engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged
in longshoring operations"; the word "including" was interpreted "to indicate that 'longshoring operations' are a part of the larger group of activities that make up 'maritime
employment"').
64. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).
65. Id.§ 7401(b)(1).
66. See, e.g., id. § 7411(b) (1) (A) (stationary sources); § 7521 (a) (1) (motor vehicles);
§ 7545(c) (1) (A) (fuels and fuel additives).
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All language referring to effects on welfare includes, but is
not limited to, effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade
materials, animals, wildlife, weather,visibility, and climate, damage to
and deterioration of property, and hazards to transportation, as
well as effects on economic values and on personal comfort and
well-being, whether caused by transformation,
conversion, or com67
bination with other air pollutants.
EPA's view that the Act "does not authorize regulation to address concerns about global climate change" 68 is completely at odds with the
concern for effects on climate and weather explicit in this provision. It
would be strange indeed for Congress to conclude, so pointedly, that
climate and weather are important components of human welfare, yet
to deprive EPA of authority to do anything about the pollutants that
most affect these features of our environment.
Indeed, even absent the express references to "climate" and
"weather" in the definition of the pivotal term "welfare," section
302(h) would nevertheless signal congressional concern with the
kinds of harms posed by air pollutants associated with climate change.
Climate change either triggers or exacerbates every one of the effects
listed in section 302(h). EPA's narrow interpretation unjustifiably
shrinks the agency's capacity to respond to effects that Congress has
undeniably directed it to address.
What is more, EPA attempted to accomplish this shrinkage
through a statutory phrase-"air pollutant"-that gives no hint of
such a repercussion. Instead, the natural reading of this term is that it
describes the large class of substances and phenomena that could potentially lead to regulation under the Act. While the Act defines "air
pollutant" broadly, EPA may only regulate emissions of air pollutants
when it concludes that they may reasonably be anticipated to endanger the public health or welfare. 69 Contrary to the claim of EPA's General Counsel, then, reading section 3 02(g)'s language as written
would not lead to the regulation of "virtually anything entering the
'70
ambient air."
67. Id. § 7602(h) (emphasis added).
68. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,928 (Sept. 8, 2003).
69. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b) (1) (A) (new stationary sources); § 7521(a)(1) (new
motor vehicles).
70. Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant, General Counsel, EPA, on EPA's Authority to Impose Mandatory Controls to Address Global Climate Change under the Clean Air
Act to Marianne L. Horinko, Acting Administrator, EPA 10 n.9 (Aug. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.icta.org/doc/FabricantMemoAug282003.pdf.
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EPA also erred in giving no weight to the Act's explicit inclusion
3
of carbon dioxide within a list of "air pollutants." Section 10 (g) directs EPA to conduct a research program concerning
"[i]mprovements in nonregulatory strategies and technologies for
preventing or reducing multiple air pollutants, including . . . carbon

dioxide."7 1 Trying to explain away this textual inclusion of the most
important greenhouse gas, EPA asserted a dichotomy between "regulatory" and "nonregulatory" programs under the Act and claimed that
the Act bars only "regulatory" activities with respect to air pollutants
associated with climate change. EPA stated that "GHGs, as such, are
not air pollutants under the CAA's regulatory provisions, including sections 108, 109, 111, 112 and 202," and that "the term 'air pollution' as
used in the regulatory provisions cannot be interpreted to encompass

global climate change. '72 On this theory, research on climate change
conducted pursuant to section 10 3 (g), 73 comports with EPA's interpretation because such activity is not "regulatory. '74 Yet research
under section 103 (g) relates to "air pollution," which EPA has said
75
does not include climate change.
Nothing in the language of the Act allows the phrase "air pollutants" to bear the double meaning EPA sought to give it. Section
302(g) does not, in defining "air pollutants," give any hint that the
reach of this phrase depends on whether a statutory program is "regulatory" or not. As the Supreme Court put it in another case, "To give
these same words a different meaning for each category would be to
76
invent a statute rather than interpret one.
Moreover, the Act does not even provide any basis for distinguishing actions that are "regulatory" in EPA's sense from ones that are not.
EPA suggested that section 821 of the 1990 amendments to the Act
("1990 Amendments"), requiring utilities subject to the Act's acid rain
control program to monitor and report their carbon dioxide emissions, is not a regulatory provision. 77 It is hard to understand what
7
71. 42 U.S.C. § 403(g) (1) (emphasis added).
72. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,928 (emphasis added).
7
73. 42 U.S.C. § 403(g).
74. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,926.
75. Id. at 52,928.
76. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005).
77. See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,926 (stating that section 821 does not "authorize( ] the imposition of mandatory requirements"). Section 821 is uncodified; it appears as a note to section 412 of the Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651k.
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EPA meant by "regulatory" or "mandatory" requirements if government-dictated monitoring and disclosure do not come within their
terms.
In its argument in front of the Supreme Court in Massachusettsv.
EPA, EPA tried to supply the textual analysis so sorely missing from its
decision on the petition to regulate greenhouse gases. EPA's argument from text now amounts to this: "air pollution agents" must have
"independent meaning" beyond the items listed in section 302(g)'s
"including" clause, and that independent meaning constrains interpretation of the phrase "any chemical, physical ...

substance or mat-

ter." 78 Only those chemical or physical substances that are also "air
pollution agents" are covered by the Act. 79 EPA has, however, pro-

vided no interpretation of the phrase "air pollution agent" beyond
saying that this term does not include greenhouse gases under the
Act's "regulatory provisions." 80 This circular reasoning lies behind the
Solicitor General's otherwise mysterious reference to "cognizable 'pollution.' '"81 The government's position appears to be that although
greenhouse gases may indeed constitute "pollution," they are not cognizable pollution under the Act. Nothing in the Act supports a distinction between "cognizable" and "non-cognizable" pollution.
Moreover, greenhouse gases clearly fall within the phrase "air pollution agents," even if one looks only at that language and ignores the
language of the "including" clause. This is true for several reasons.
First, focusing on carbon dioxide: carbon dioxide is specifically
named as an "air pollutant" in section 103 (g) of the Act. 82 EPA has
asked the Supreme Court to ignore this unambiguous textual inclusion of carbon dioxide in a list of "air pollutants" based on its theory
that the Act draws a bright line between "regulatory" and "nonregulatory" provisions.8 3 However, as already discussed, EPA's rigid distinction between "regulatory" and "nonregulatory" provisions has no
support in the text or structure of the Act.
In addition, EPA itself has acknowledged that greenhouse gases
exacerbate ozone pollution by exacerbating the conditions that create
78.

U.S. Brief, supra note 15, at 34.
79. Id.
80. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,928.
81. U.S. Brief, supra note 15, at 33.
82.
83.

42 U.S.C. § 7 4 03(g).
U.S. Brief, supra note 15, at 34-35.
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this pollution. 8 4 Thus, greenhouse gases are "agents" of ozone "air
pollution." Greenhouse gases help to bring about air pollution in the
form of ozone; this is precisely what an "agent"-of "air pollution"does.
In sum, a straightforward reading of the language of the Clean
Air Act shows that carbon dioxide and other air pollutants associated
with climate change are "air pollutants" potentially subject to regulation under section 202(a) (1). Whatever the outer limits of the term
"air pollution agents," they are not close to being reached by including carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons
within the ambit of this term. Not only do these chemicals fit exactly
within the "including" clause of the definition of "air pollution
agents," they also easily qualify as "air pollution agents" even without
consideration of that clause. Indeed, as explained in Part II.E below,
EPA has recognized as much in other regulatory proceedings. Perhaps
this is why EPA has made no effort to define "air pollution agents"
except to say that this term does not include greenhouse gases when
they are being regulated as greenhouse gases. And it has not so much
as mentioned the other proceedings in which it has taken a different
approach to these chemicals. But interpretation for the nonce is not
interpretation at all; it is merely improvisation.
B.

"Economic and Political Significance"

As we have just seen, the statutory text does not work for EPA.
Thus, EPA has relied heavily on a recent case that rejected a literal
reading of statutory text in part because of the "economic and politi85
cal significance" of the matter at hand.
In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the Court overturned
FDA's regulation of tobacco products as "drugs" under the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act 8 6 ("FDCA") .87 Before turning to the statutory
scheme before it, the Court cautioned that it "must be guided to a
degree by common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely
to delegate a policy decision of such economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency." 8 8 Acknowledging its usual policy of
84. See Control of Emissions from New and In-Use Highway Vehicles and Engines, 66
Fed. Reg. 18,245, 18,246 (Jan. 23, 2001).
85. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,928.
86. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000).
87. Brown & Wdliarnson, 529 U.S. at 155-56.
88. Id. at 133.
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deferring to agency interpretations of the statutes they administer un89
less Congress has "directly spoken to the precise question at issue,"
the Court found that the issue of tobacco regulation was too important to conclude that Congress had delegated interpretive authority to
FDA on this issue:
[Oiur inquiry into whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue is shaped, at least in some measure, by the
nature of the question presented. Deference under Chevron to an
agency's construction of a statute that it administers is premised on
the theory that a statute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps. In
extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate
before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation....
• . . Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of
and political significance to an agency in so cryptic
such economic
90
a fashion.
Other than "economic and political significance," however, EPA's
decision on greenhouse gases bears no resemblance to FDA's decision
on tobacco.
For decades prior to FDA's decision to regulate tobacco, the
agency had disclaimed any authority to regulate tobacco under the
FDCA.9 1 Moreover, Congress had enacted numerous tobacco-specific
laws explicitly relying on FDA's interpretation. 92 Thus a whole regulatory regime, created by Congress, had sprung up in response to FDA's
disclaimers of regulatory authority. FDA's own regulatory framework
for tobacco stood in sharp contrast to the framework Congress had
developed over the years. 9 3
In Massachusetts v. EPA, in contrast, EPA had not spent decades
disclaiming authority to regulate greenhouse gases, and thus no legislation was enacted premised on such disclaimers. In fact, prior to the
decision challenged in Massachusetts v. EPA, EPA had acknowledged
that it did have authority to regulate greenhouse gases. In response to
congressional inquiries, two EPA General Counsels stated that the
94
Clean Air Act gives the agency the power to regulate carbon dioxide.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
52,922,

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159-60 (citations omitted).
Id. at 157.
Id. at 154-57.
Id. at 148-56.
Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,923, 52,924 (Sept. 8, 2003).
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In Brown & Williamson, moreover, the Court thought that FDA's
view on its regulatory authority could have but one regulatory consequence: a total ban on tobacco products. 95 Yet Congress's legislation
on tobacco clearly assumed that tobacco products would remain legal.9 6 In this way, too, the Court found that FDA's regulatory program
7
was at odds with the program Congress itself had developed.9
Nothing so dramatic as a ban on automobiles would come from
recognition of EPA authority to regulate greenhouse gases. Regulating greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act would merely lead to
EPA setting economically and technologically feasible emission standards-something the agency has done for decades for other pollutants emitted by motor vehicles. 98
Massachusetts v. EPA is thus worlds away from Brown & Williamson.
In relying on Brown & Williamson, EPA has encouraged the Court to
focus not on the relevant statutory text, but instead on the political
and economic consequences of a ruling in petitioners' favor. Making
interpretive principles turn, not on statutory text but on the Court's
own view of the political and economic ramifications of a case, is the
very antithesis of judicial restraint.
C.

"They Call It Pollution, We Call It Life"

In the spring of 2006, the Competitive Enterprise Institute
("CEI") ran television spots on carbon dioxide. The tag line: "They
call it pollution. We call it life." 99 Amazingly, the basic message of
these commercials has resurfaced in industry respondents' briefs in
Massachusetts v. EPA.
First, the automobile and utility industry respondents have argued that carbon dioxide is not an "air pollution agent" because it
does not make the air "dirty."' 0 0 This is not a word used in the Act. It
is hard to know what respondents mean by it. For example, carbon
95.
96.

529 U.S. at 137.

Id. at 143-44.
Id. at 134-43.
98. Section 202 includes protections designed to prevent severe economic impacts.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(2) (2000).
99. Competitive Enterprise Institute, http://www.cei.org/pages/co2.cfm (last visited
Aug. 11, 2007) (showing two sixty-second ads focusing on the alleged global warming crisis
that aired in several United States cities in May 2006).
100. Brief for Respondent Utility Air Regulatory Group at 46, Massachusetts v. EPA,
127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 3101955, at *46 [hereinafter UARG Brief];
Brief for Respondents Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers et al. at 20-21, Massachusetts
v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 3023028, at *20-21 [hereinafter
AAM Brief].

97.
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monoxide is not "dirty" in the usual sense of the term; it is colorless and
odorless (this is why carbon monoxide detectors are needed)., 0 1 Yet
carbon monoxide has been regulated under section 202 of the Act for
decades, 10 2 and no one involved in Massachusetts v. EPA has questioned the appropriateness of this regulation.
More closely echoing CEI's commercials, automobile industry respondents also assert that carbon dioxide is not an "air pollution
agent" because it is "essential to life."' 0 3 Yet chromium and selenium,
for example, are essential nutrients, 10 4 and EPA nonetheless regulates
chromium and selenium compounds as hazardous air pollutants
under the Act. 10 5 EPA has, moreover, recently announced a proposed
rule that would control the use of carbon dioxide as a substitute for
ozone-depleting substances because carbon dioxide is deadly at certain concentrations.'0 6 Many substances have benign, or even beneficent, consequences at lower concentrations and malign consequences
at higher concentrations.' 0 7 Respondents' categorical treatment of
carbon dioxide as "essential to life" ignores this basic scientific
principle.
D.

Other "Indicia of Legislative Intent"

EPA adopted its question-begging reading of the text of the
Clean Air Act because it concluded, wrongly, that Congress had either
deprived it of jurisdiction in more recent enactments, or had otherwise made clear to the agency that Congress, not EPA, should deal
with climate change. None of the arguments the agency has made in
support of this claim is sound.
First up is EPA's invocation of failed legislative proposals. In its
decision concluding that it had no authority to regulate greenhouse
gases, EPA noted that when Congress amended the Act in 1990, it did
101. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, Carbon Monoxide Questions and Answers,
CPSC Document #466, available at http://www.cpsc.gov/CPSCPUB/PUBS/466.html (last
visited Aug. 3, 2007).
102. See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1676,1690.
103. AAM Brief, supra note 100, at 20.
104. See HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 401 tbl.60-2, 410 (Kasper et al.
eds., 16th ed. 2005).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (2000).
106. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Listing of Substitutes in the Motor Vehicle Air
Conditioning Sector Under the Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP) Program, 71
Fed. Reg. 55,140, 55,143 (Sept. 21, 2006) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82 (2006)).
107. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 9 (1993) ("Drinking a bottle of pure iodine is deadly; placing a drop of diluted
iodine on a cut is helpful.").
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not enact the specific carbon dioxide emission limits then proposed.' 08 EPA also cited several other legislative proposals that were
not enacted.O9 EPA argued that because Congress was aware of the
issue of climate change when it amended the Act in 1990, its failure to
enact proposals to regulate carbon dioxide signaled that it was "awaiting further information before deciding itself whether regulation to
address global climate change is warranted and, if so, what form it
should take."' 10
The statutory language showing that EPA has authority to regulate carbon dioxide and other air pollutants associated with climate
change was in place before the 1990 Amendments, and indeed,
before any of the failed legislative proposals EPA cited were developed. By the plain terms of the statute, EPA already possessed the authority to regulate greenhouse gases at the time of these proposals.
EPA appears to think that subsequent unenacted legislation can
amend prior enacted legislation. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
rejected such an approach.1 1 1 Moreover, if failed legislative proposals
were good evidence of prior legislative intent, then petitioners in Masl2
sachusetts v. EPA could cite such evidence on their side as well."
EPA is also laboring under the misimpression that subsequently
enacted legislation can silently undo previously granted authority and
can do so even when the two pieces of legislation can happily coexist.
EPA cited provisions from the 1990 Amendments to the Act and from
other legislation in asserting that Congress meant for EPA to take a
strictly "nonregulatory" approach to climate change.1 1 3 Nothing in
these provisions expressly or impliedly removes the authority granted
by section 202(a) (1).

1 4

108. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,926 (Sept. 8, 2003).
109. Id. at 52,928.
110. Id. at 52,927.
111. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159, 169-70 (2001) ("[Flailed legislative proposals are 'a particularly dangerous
ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute."') (quoting Cent. Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994)); Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977) ("It is the intent of the Congress that enacted [the provision at issue], unmistakable in this case, that controls.").
112. H.R. 2221, 106th Cong. §§ 3(b), 2(a)(2) (1999) (failed proposal to strip EPA of
authority to regulate emissions of carbon dioxide, citing EPA's position, at the time, that
carbon dioxide was a "pollutant").
113. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,926, 52,927 (citing sections 103, 602, and uncodified section 821 of the Act).
114. Section 103 (g) says only that "[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to
authorize the imposition on any person of air pollution control requirements." 42 U.S.C.
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In fact, as discussed above, one of the "nonregulatory" provisions
EPA relied upon, section 103(g), reinforces the interpretation of the
phrase "air pollutant" dictated by the plain text of section 302(g). By
expressly including carbon dioxide in a list of enumerated "air pollutants," section 10 3 (g) reaffirms that this greenhouse gas is an "air pol11 5
lutant" under the Act.
Apart from these provisions in the Clean Air Act, Congress has,
since 1977, also enacted several statutes pertaining to global climate
change. 116 Because such legislation principally called for further research and other "nonregulatory" measures, EPA thought that these
enactments demonstrated that Congress meant to withhold from EPA
regulatory authority to address climate change. 11 7 Once again, however, EPA did not-and, given the content of these statutes, could
not-claim that these enactments erased its existing authority to regulate "air pollutants." 1 8 In trying to snuff meaning out of 19 70s legislation based on legislation of the 1980s and 1990s, EPA is struggling
uphill against the "cardinal rule.., that repeals by implication are not
favored."119
§ 7 403(g) (2000) (emphasis added). Likewise, section 602(e) directs EPA to "publish the
global warming potential" of ozone-depleting substances designated for phase-out under
the Act, and then states that "[t] he precedingsentence shall not be construed to be the basis
of any additional regulation under this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 7671a(e) (emphasis added).
Neither of these provisions utters a peep about section 202(a)(1).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 7403(g).
116. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, tit. XVI, 106 Stat. 2776 (calling
for an assessment of the feasibility of reducing greenhouse gases and creating a national
inventory and voluntary reporting of greenhouse gas emissions); Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, tit. XXIV, 104 Stat. 3359 (establishing a program to coordinate climate change research and policy within the Department of
Agriculture); Global Change Research Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-606, 104 Stat. 3096
(authorizing a comprehensive research effort); Global Climate Protection Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-204, tit. XI, 101 Stat. 1331 (requiring the President to develop a national
policy on climate change); National Climate Program Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-367, 92
Stat. 601 (establishing a program to assist the nation in understanding and responding to
climate change).
117. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,927.
118. EPA's citation to congressional actions pertaining to climate treaty negotiations in
the 1990s, Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, is even further
removed from the meaning of the Clean Air Act provisions enacted in the 1970s. These
actions did not mention, let alone limit, existing domestic regulatory authority. See S. REP.
No. 105-54 (1997); see also Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112
Stat. 2461 (1998).
119. Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 132 (2003) (quoting
Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)).
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EPA's aim in citing the above "indicia of congressional intent"failed proposals and legislation enacted after the statutory text at issue
here was in place-was to show that Congress intended to "learn more
about the global climate change issue before specifically authorizing
regulation to address it." 1 2 0 Apart from the problems already discussed, there are additional flaws in EPA's analysis.
First, numerous provisions of the Clean Air Act explicitly require
EPA or other entities to "learn more about" an environmental issue
and to report back to Congress with recommendations for legislation.1 2 1 In addition, before the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control
Act of 1965122 created the first federal regulatory program for motor
vehicle emissions, Congress had twice directed first the Surgeon General, and then the Secretary of Health and Human Welfare, to conduct research on the consequences of air pollution from motor
vehicles and to report back to it with recommendations for legislation
on the subject. 12 3 If, in section 202(a) (1) of the Clean Air Act, Con-

gress had really wanted to create the kind of nonregulatory, reportand-wait program EPA envisions, it could easily have replicated the
language of these other provisions and tailored it to the issue of climate change. It did not do this.
Second, EPA's argument implies that ongoing research only precedes, and cannot coexist with, regulation under the Act. Yet section
202 and other key sections of the Act call for EPA to take regulatory
action against dangers to public health and welfare even when some
scientific uncertainty remains. Research and regulation walk hand in
hand under the Act, and thus calls by Congress for more research on
124
a topic have naturally been paired with commands for regulation.
120. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,928.
121. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(1)-(2) (2000) (requiring report to Congress on program regulating hazardous air pollutants and contemplating further agency action only in
the event Congress does not act on agency recommendations); § 7412(r)(6) (directing
Chemical Safety Board to report to Congress on accidental hazardous releases and to make
recommendations).
122. Act of Oct. 20, 1965, Pub. L. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (amending the Clean Air Act).
123. Act ofJune 8, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-493, 74 Stat. 162; Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 8874 1 76 7
1q (2000)).
0 206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§
124. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a), (d) (providing for establishment of National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") and continuing research on the scientific basis of the
standards); § 7412(d), (f) (1) (providing for technology-based regulation of hazardous air
pollutants and continuing research into adequacy of this regulation in protecting public
health); §§ 7521 (a), 7548 (calling for regulation of air pollution from motor vehicles and
study of effects on public health and welfare of particulate matter emissions from motor
vehicles).
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Third, EPA states that Congress must "specifically authoriz[el"' 125 a
regulatory program before EPA may act. This notion is at odds with
the system created by the Act. What EPA seems to mean is that Congress must say the words "carbon dioxide" or "greenhouse gases" in
specific regulatory provisions of the Act before a regulatory program
addressing these matters may be developed. This is not the way the
statute works.1 26 On the contrary, the Act does not attempt, in advance, to identify all of the possible targets of regulatory activity. Even
where Congress has painstakingly listed pollutants that it wishes to
regulate, it has also recognized that further research may identify additional harmful pollutants that should be brought into the regulatory
fold. 12 7 In many other cases, Congress has identified the targets of
128
regulation in general terms, leaving the details for EPA to fill in.
One famous example of this framework in operation is EPA's reduction of the lead content of gasoline. The 1970 version of section
211 of the Clean Air Act authorized the Administrator to "control or
prohibit the manufacture, introduction into commerce, offering for
sale, or sale of any fuel or fuel additive for use in a motor vehicle or
motor vehicle engine (A) if any emission products of such fuel or fuel
additive will endanger the public health or welfare."' 129 This provision
did not mention the fuel additive lead. Despite the Act's lack of an
explicit reference to leaded gasoline, EPA in 1973 ordered a dramatic
reduction in the lead content of gasoline. 13 1 The agency later ordered still steeper reductions.13' EPA based its decisions to phase
down lead in gasoline on broadly worded statutory language that did
not specifically grant it authority to regulate lead in gasoline. 132 These
125. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,928 (emphasis added).
126. Nor is it the way most statutes work. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
491 U.S. 440, 475 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating Congress "usually does not
legislate by specifying examples, but by identifying broad and general principles that must
be applied to particular factual instances").
127. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (listing nearly 200 hazardous air pollutants to be
regulated); § 7412(b) (2)-(3) (B) (making way for additions to the list).
128. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a) (criteria air pollutants); § 7411 (b) (1) (A) (stationary
sources subject to New Source Performance Standards); § 7545(c) (fuels and fuel
additives).
129. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 211(c)(1), 84 Stat. 1676,
1698.
130. Control of Lead Additives in Gasoline, 38 Fed. Reg. 33,734, 33,734 (Dec. 6, 1973)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80 (1973)).
131. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives; Gasoline Lead Content, 50 Fed. Reg.
9386, 9386 (Mar. 7, 1985) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80 (1985)).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 7545.
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decisions were economically and politically momentous. The interpretive method EPA embraced in declining to regulate greenhouse gases
would have doomed the lead phase-down from the get-go.
In disclaiming authority to regulate air pollutants associated with
climate change, EPA also pointed to two important programs under
the Act which the agency said would fit so uneasily with regulation of
these pollutants that Congress could not have intended these pollutants to be regulated at all. These claims are meritless.
EPA asserted, first, that Congress's enactment in 1990 of Title VI
of the Act,' 33 which regulates chemicals that threaten the stratospheric ozone layer, "cautions against construing [the Act's] provisions to authorize regulation of emissions that may contribute to
global climate change.

13

4

EPA stated that the enactment of Title VI

"demonstrate [s] that Congress has understood the need for specially
tailored solutions to global atmospheric issues."' 35 Once again, EPA
sought to use provisions enacted in 1990 to discern-and to limitthe meaning of provisions enacted in the 1970s. Moreover, as discussed below, EPA has used the very statutory program under discussion here-relating to stratospheric ozone depletion-as a basis for
regulating air pollutants associated with climate change.
In any event, EPA cannot seriously maintain that "coordination
with the international community" is a prerequisite for regulating pollutants that "are emitted around the world and are very long-lived,"
the consequences of which "occur on a global scale."'136 Congress directed EPA to regulate ozone-depleting substances themselves without
awaiting such coordination.1 3 7 In addition, EPA has recently issued a
rule regulating mercury emissions. 38 Mercury is (to use EPA's words
in describing greenhouse gases and ozone-depleting substances) a
pollutant "emitted around the world" that is "very long-lived" and exerts effects "on a global scale."' 39 Even so, the agency has not made
76 7
1- 7 6 7 1q.
133. Id. §§
134. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,926 (Sept. 8, 2003).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 7426; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 126, 91
Stat. 685, 724.
138. Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606, 28,606 (May 18, 2005) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 60, 72, 75 (2005)).
139. See Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous
Air Pollutants from Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,994, 16,011,
16,012 (Mar. 29, 2005) (stating that mercury is "persistent," and there exists a "global
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domestic regulation of mercury await "coordination with the international community."
EPA's claim based on the National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") program is equally unsound. EPA concluded that
the NAAQS system, created by sections 108-110 of the Act, 140 is "fundamentally ill-suited to addressing [greenhouse] gases in relation to
global climate change," and on this basis asserted that Congress did
not intend EPA to regulate these pollutants under any part of the Act,
including section 202.14 EPA's move is a classic debater's trick: when
you're losing the argument, change the subject.
The NAAQS program is an entirely separate program from the
mobile source program at issue in Massachusetts v. EPA. Nothing in the
Act suggests that regulation under the mobile source program must
stand or fall with regulation under the NAAQS program. Congress
created the federal program for controlling air pollution from motor
vehicles in 1965, five years before the Act created the NAAQS program. Congress did not choose to merge the programs, and they retain significant independent status and effects.
Organizationally, Title II of the Act regulates mobile sources,
which is separate from Title I, concerning the NAAQS." 42 Moreover,
while the federal government sets the NAAQS, the states are primarily
responsible for implementing them,1 43 whereas the federal government sets the emission standards for mobile sources, and states have a
more circumscribed role (with the exception that California may set
its own standards, subject to certain constraints)." 4 Furthermore, the
two programs cover different pollutants. For example, benzene and
formaldehyde must be regulated under the mobile source program," 4 5 but they are not regulated under the NAAQS program.
The NAAQS program and the mobile source program are also
initiated by different regulatory triggers. Regulation of mobile sources
is triggered under section 202 (a) (1) by a determination that air pollu[mercury] cycle"); Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,827 (Dec. 20, 2000) (estmating that roughly forty percent of the mercury deposited in the United States comes
from sources in other countries).
140. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7410.
141. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,927 (Sept. 8, 2003).
142. Cf Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) ("The NAAQS...
are the engine that drives nearly all of Title I of the CAA .... ) (emphasis added).
143. See, e.g., id. at 470.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a), (b).
145. Id. § 7521(1) (2).
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tion from motor vehicles "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare." 1 46 Although an endangerment decision of
this kind is also a prerequisite to regulation under the NAAQS program, 14 7 the NAAQS provision includes additional triggering lan14 8
guage as well.

In any event, whether or not the NAAQS program may appropriately be applied to greenhouse gases, there is no gainsaying that the
mobile source program of section 202 may be so applied. Section 202
sets up a perfectly feasible framework for regulating emission of
greenhouse gases from motor vehicles: the establishment of the same
sort of technology-based limits that EPA has already set for other pollutants emitted by motor vehicles.
EPA also asserted that Congress has not authorized the agency to
set standards for carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles to the
extent that such standards would regulate fuel economy 149 because
such regulation would be inconsistent with the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act 150 ("EPCA"). EPCA, administered by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration15 ' ("NHTSA"), sets minimum
corporate average fuel economy ("CAFE") standards for automobiles.' 5 2 EPA claimed that the only practical way to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from vehicles is to improve fuel economy and that the
care Congress exercised in creating a system for regulating fuel economy in EPCA demonstrated that EPCA was meant to be the only statutory vehicle for doing so.153 Here, EPA fundamentally misread the
Clean Air Act and EPCA and again violated sound principles of statutory interpretation.
The relevant provisions of EPCA and the Clean Air Act have fundamentally different purposes. EPCA's provisions were passed to promote energy efficiency;' 54 the Clean Air Act's provisions were passed
146. Id. § 7521 (a) (1).
147. See id. § 7408(a)(1)(A).
148. See, e.g., id. § 7408(a) (1) (requiring the Administrator to list new pollutants "for
which he plans to issue air quality criteria").
149. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,929 (Sept. 8, 2003).
150. 49 U.S.C. §§ 32,901-32,919 (2000).
151. The Secretary of Transportation has delegated his responsibilities under EPCA to
NHTSA. 49 C.F.R. 1.50(f) (2006).
152. 49 U.S.C. 32,902.
153. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,929.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 6201(5) (2000).
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to protect public health and welfare. 155 The fact that in EPCA Congress created a system to strike a particular balance between energy
conservation and other considerations has no bearing on the balance
that Congress intended the EPA Administrator to strike if, in his judgment, he determined that carbon dioxide emissions from vehicles
were endangering public health and welfare.
EPA's argument is premised on the assumption that the two provisions are inconsistent. They are not. The statutes may overlap but
they are not irreconcilable, and manufacturers will be able to continue to comply with both statutes, as they have for decades. Regulatory overlap is common.' 5 6 In cases of alleged conflict between two
statutes, the Supreme Court has consistently held that both must be
given effect wherever possible: "The courts are not at liberty to pick
and choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes
are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly
expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as
effective."1

57

To be sure, many technologies employed to reduce carbon dioxide emissions may well result in consuming less fuel per mile of travel.
These overlapping impacts are not inconsistent because the standards
set pursuant to both statutes are minimum standards.' 58 Because
both statutes set minimum standards, an automobile manufacturer's
compliance with one statute does not interfere with its compliance
with the other.
Congress recognized these potentially overlapping effects. Indeed, the Clean Air Act and EPCA refer to each other. EPCA provides
that when setting new fuel efficiency standards, NHTSA must take
into account "the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy,"1 59 which include emissions standards
under the Clean Air Act. Similarly, the Clean Air Act allows automobile manufacturers a limited waiver of certain emission standards for
oxides of nitrogen if this would, among other things, enable greater

155. Id. § 7521 (a)(1).
156. FTC v. Ken Roberts, Co., 276 F.3d 583, 593 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[W]e live in 'an age
of overlapping and concurring regulatory jurisdiction'.... ) (quoting Thompson Med.
Co. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
157. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974); see also, e.g.,J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v.
Pioneer, 534 U.S. 124, 143-44 (2001).
158. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (a)(1); 49 U.S.C. §§ 32,901(a) (6), 32,902 (2000).
159. 49 U.S.C. § 32,902(f).
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fuel economy. 160 These statutes were thus written with respectful attention to each other. Congress expressly acknowledged that EPA is
authorized under the Clean Air Act to set motor vehicle emission standards that could affect fuel economy, both positively and negatively.
Nothing in EPCA limits the circumstances under which EPA may set
motor vehicle emission standards for air pollutants that cause or contribute to endangerment of the public health or welfare, just as nothing in the Clean Air Act undoes NHTSA's authority to address fuel
efficiency.
E.

Arbitrariness and Caprice

Deference to EPA's interpretation is appropriate only if the statutory text is ambiguous, and the interpretation is reasonable. 16' As explained, the text is unambiguous. Even if it were not, however, EPA's
interpretation deserves no deference because it is arbitrary and
162
capricious.
Making up one's mind first and then looking for reasons to support one's decision is the very soul of arbitrariness. Here, EPA backed
into its conclusion that carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and
hydrofluorocarbons are not "air pollution agents" within the meaning
of the Act by first reaching its substantive bottom line and then forcing that conclusion into the statutory text:
We thus conclude that the CAA does not authorize regulation to
address concerns about global climate change.
It follows from this conclusion, that GHGs, as such, are not air
pollutants under the CAA's regulatory provisions, including sections 108, 109, 111, 112 and 202 ....
Because EPA lacks CAA regulatory authority to address global climate change, the term "airpollution" as
used in the regulatoryprovisions cannot be interpreted to encompass global
climate change. Thus, CO 2 and other GHGs are not "agents" of air
2
(g) definition of
pollution and do not satisfy the CAA section 3 0163
"air pollutant" for purposes of those provisions.
If this is the way statutory interpretation works, EPA could also
have declared that automobiles emitting carbon dioxide and other air
pollutants associated with climate change are not "motor vehicles"
within the meaning of the Act when they are emitting those chemi160. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b) (3) (C). Congress inadvertently included two subsections
denominated "(b) (3)" in section 202. Id. n.2. This provision is in the second of those. Id.
§ 7521 (b)(3)(C).
161. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
162. Id. at 844.
163. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,928 (Sept. 8, 2003) (emphasis added).
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cals. Once interpretation is unmoored from statutory language, as
EPA has done, one can, like Humpty Dumpty, use words to mean
whatever the user chooses them to mean.
EPA's decisionmaking regarding air pollutants associated with climate change is also capricious. EPA does not consistently apply the
definition of "air pollutants" and "air pollution" it offered in Massachusetts v. EPA. Indeed, EPA has regulated-as "air pollutants"-most
of the chemicals at issue in that case. For example, the agency is requiring the monitoring of carbon dioxide emissions from nonroad
equipment pursuant to section 103(a), 16 4 which authorizes research
' 165
into "air pollution.
In addition, EPA considers the global warming potential of proposed substitutes for ozone-depleting substances in evaluating those
substitutes under provisions of the Clean Air Act addressing stratospheric ozone depletion. 1 66 EPA has ruled that the use of two
hydrofluorocarbons 67 (HFC-134a and HFC-152a) in self-chilling cans
is an unacceptable substitute for ozone-depleting substances, based
entirely on these chemicals' global warming potential. 168 Section 618
of the Act specifically provides that requirements concerning stratospheric ozone depletion are "requirements for the control and abatement of air pollution" within the meaning of sections 116 and 118 of
the Act. 169 EPA's assertion that "the term 'air pollution' as used in the
regulatory provisions cannot be interpreted to encompass global climate change,"'170 cannot be squared with its regulatory actions with
respect to substitutes for ozone-depleting substances.
Furthermore, ten years ago, EPA added municipal solid waste
landfills to the list of sources to be regulated under the Clean Air Act
based on the Administrator's determination that these landfills met
164. 42 U.S.C. § 7403(a).
165. Agency Information Collection Activities, 69 Fed. Reg. 12,151, 12,151 (Mar. 15,
2004).
166. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,044, 13,049 (Mar. 18, 1994)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 82 (1994)).
167. Hydrofluorocarbons are among the chemicals petitioners asked EPA to regulate.
See supra text accompanying note 16.
168. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone; Listing of Substitutes for Ozone-Depleting
Substances, 64 Fed. Reg. 10,374, 10,375 (Mar. 3, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82
(1999)); see also, e.g., Protection of Stratospheric Ozone; Listing of Substitutes for OzoneDepleting Substances, 64 Fed. Reg. 22,982, 22,984 (Apr. 28, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
82 (1999)) (listing another substitute as unacceptable based in part on global warming
potential).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 7671q (emphasis added).
170. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,928 (Sept. 8, 2003).
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section lII's standard of endangerment. a 71 EPA included methane
within "the emissions of concern" emanating from landfills, explaining: "Methane emissions contribute to global climate change and can result
in fires or explosions when they accumulate in structures on or off the
landfill site."1 7 2 Yet methane is one of the chemicals EPA has now said

is not an "air pollutant" under the Act.
Thus, EPA regulates air pollutants associated with climate change
as "air pollutants" under the Clean Air Act. It sometimes even does so
because they are implicated in climate change. The agency was incorrect, therefore, when it stated that "GHGs are not 'agents' of air pollution and do not satisfy the CAA section 3 02(g) definition of 'air
pollutant' for purposes of [the Act's regulatory] provisions."' 7 3 What
EPA should have said was that it will let us know when these chemicals
are "air pollutants," and when they are not, based not upon the statutory text but upon the agency's own unpredictable amendments to
the statutory text. Even if the statutory language were ambiguous,
which it is not, the ad-libbed interpretation EPA has offered in Massachusetts v. EPA deserves no deference from the Court.

IH.

Discretion

EPA also erred in concluding that it could decline under section
202(a) (1) to regulate air pollutants associated with climate change on
the basis of factors not enumerated in that provision. Even when an
agency is declining to regulate, it may not depart from the unambigu17 4
ous language of the statute in making its decision.
In the section of its decision relevant here, entitled "Different
Policy Approach," EPA gave the reasons why it would refuse to regu171. Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and Guidelines for Control
of Existing Sources: Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 61 Fed. Reg. 9905, 9905 (Mar. 12,
1996) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (1996)) (applying section 7411(b)(1) (A)).
172. Id. at 9905 (emphasis added); see also Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards for the Landfills Point Source
Category, 63 Fed. Reg. 6426, 6454 (Feb. 6, 1998) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 445 (1998))
("The primary source of air pollution from landfills is due to the microbial breakdown of
organic wastes from within the landfill. Landfills are known to be major sources of greenhouse gas emissions such as methane and CARBON DIOXIDE. These emissions are now regulated under the CLEAN AIR ACT as a result of the landfill New Source Performance
Standards and Emissions Guidelines, promulgated by EPA on March 12, 1996.").
173. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,928.
174. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. NHTSA, 898 F.2d 165, 169-70 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(holding that judicial review of denial of rulemaking petition is "guided by Chevron
analysis").
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late greenhouse gases from motor vehicles even if it had the authority
to do so: it thought regulation under section 202(a) (1) was "piecemeal and inefficient"; it gestured toward the potential foreign policy
implications of pursuing regulation under the Clean Air Act; it stated
that technology might not be available to reduce all of the greenhouse
gas emissions the petition covered; and it outlined uncertainties re175
maining in our understanding of climate change.
Nowhere did EPA assert that it was declining to regulate due to
resource constraints, competing priorities, or an inability to determine whether the statutory standard of endangerment was met-factors that might counsel chariness in judicial review. Nevertheless, EPA
and other respondents have asked the Supreme Court for an especially forgiving standard of review. In doing so, they have ignored the
actual structure of EPA's decision. That decision must be reversed if it
is inconsistent with the Act. It is.
A.

Standard of Review

A court reviewing an agency decision "shall . . .compel agency
action unlawfully withheld."' 1 76 EPA's decision not to regulate greenhouse gases from motor vehicles should be overturned if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law."' 177 Under this standard, petitioners in Massachusetts v. EPA should win. It is understandable, therefore, that respondents have worked very hard to convince the Court to apply a
different standard of review.
Indeed, respondents' briefs brim with hints that EPA's decision
declining to regulate greenhouse gases from motor vehicles might not
be reviewable at all. 1 78 Automobile industry respondents have argued
that agency refusals to issue rules are fundamentally different from
agency decisions to issue rules and that this difference makes the former "effectively nonreviewable."' 179 They stopped short, however, of
actually saying that EPA's decision is unreviewable, settling instead for
a "more deferential standard" than the one that would be applied to
agency rules or revocations of rules. 180
175. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,929-31.
176. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2000).
177. Id. § 706(2) (A).
178. U.S. Brief, supra note 15, at 38 & n.15, 45 & n.21; AAM Brief, supra note 100, at 43,
44.
179. AAM Brief, supra note 100, at 43.
180. U.S. Brief, supra note 15, at 39.
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As support for a different standard of review for EPA's decision
refusing to regulate greenhouse gases, the Solicitor General cites the
Court's decisions in Heckler v. Chaney' 8 and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.' 8 2 In Heckler, of

course, as the Solicitor General notes, the Court did not even address
rulemaking proceedings.1 8 3 Moreover, the Court based its decision as
much on an analogy to prosecutorial decisions not to indict and their
historical immunity from review as on the concerns the Solicitor General identifies. 18 4 Agency decisions not to promulgate rules do not implicate the prosecutorial discretion protected in Chaney.1 85 As for State
Farm, the Court's only reference to the actual standard of review that
might be applicable to refusals to promulgate rules was the Court's
mention of what the petitioners in that case thought that standard
would be. 186 The case does not hold that a different standard of review applies to refusals to promulgate rules or, more particularly, that
an agency that refuses to issue a rule has more leeway in interpreting a
statute than an agency that issues a rule.
The Court's practice in reviewing agency decisions confirms that
there is no special rule of interpretation reserved for agency refusals
to promulgate rules. In Young v. Community Nutrition Institute,187 for
example, the Court reviewed the refusal of FDA to promulgate a rule
limiting aflatoxin in food.18 8 FDA's decision was challenged as a misinterpretation of its governing statute. 189 Using ordinary tools of statutory interpretation, the Court investigated whether FDA had legally
erred in refusing to promulgate the rule.' 90 The Court upheld FDA's
decision, but it did so by applying an ordinary standard of review to
the case. 19 1
In Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society, 192 moreover, in
a context strikingly similar to the one presented in Massachusetts v.
181. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
182. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
183. U.S. Brief, supra note 15, at 38 n.15; 470 U.S. at 825 n.2.
184. 470 U.S. at 832.
185. See Am. Horse Prot. Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
186. 463 U.S. at 42.
187. 476 U.S. 974 (1986).
188. Id. at 977-78.
189. Id. at 980.
190. Id. at 979-84.
191. To similar effect are FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466 U.S. 463, 465-66,
469-74 (1984) (reviewing denial of rulemaking petition based on ordinary principles of
statutory construction), and NAACP v. Federal Power Commussion, 425 U.S. 662, 664, 666-71
(1976) (same).
192. 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
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EPA, the Court scrutinized the Secretary of Commerce's refusal to certify thatJapan's whaling practices "diminish[ed] the effectiveness" of
the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, using ordinary tools of statutory construction. 19 3 There, the Court made clear
that an agency may not refuse to make a finding contemplated by a
statute "for any reason not connected with the aims and... goals" of
94
the relevant law.'
Likewise, the D.C. Circuit-contrary to respondents' suggestions
in Massachusetts v. EPA' 9 5-reviews refusals to promulgate rules under
the same standard it uses for informal agency rulemaking. This is not
surprising, since section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA") does not draw the distinction respondents cite. For this reason, the very cases cited by respondents clearly hold that agency refusals to promulgate rules are to be overturned if the agency commits a
"plain error of law."' 19 6 The D.C. Circuit has, in fact, explicitly rejected
the analogy to Chaney on which the government relied in Massachusetts
v. EPA19 7 and has overturned agencies' denials of rulemaking petitions where the denials were grounded in an error of law. 9 8s To be
sure, the D.C. Circuit has been hesitant to overturn agency refusals to
regulate where those refusals are grounded in "factors not inherently
susceptible to judicial resolution," such as competing agency priorities,19 9 but those factors are not present in Massachusettsv. EPA, where
petitioners' claim is that EPA's decision rested on a misinterpretation
of the statute on which the decision was based.
Creating a more deferential interpretive standard in the context
of agency refusals to take action would not only be inconsistent with
existing precedent and the APA, it would have far-reaching (and bad)
effects. A substantial number of regulatory regimes prohibit certain
conduct or commercial activity in the absence of an agency decision
allowing it; food additives, 20 0 new drugs, 20 1 and certain medical de193. Id. at 228.
194. Id. at 233.
195. U.S. Brief, supra note 15, at 36-37; UARG Brief, supra note 100, at 26-29; AAM
Brief, supra note 100, at 44.
196. Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Oper., Inc. v. FERC, 388 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C.
Cir. 2004); Am. Horse Prot. Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Gen.
Motors Corp. v. NHTSA, 898 F.2d 165, 169-70 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (agency refusal to institute
rulemaking guided by ordinary principles of statutory construction).
197. Am. Horse Prot. Ass'n, 812 F.2d at 4.
198. See, e.g., id. at 7 (overturning agency refusal to institute rulemaking where agency
head had proved "blind to the nature of his mandate from Congress").
199. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
200. 21 U.S.C. § 348(a) (2) (2000).
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vices, 20 2 to name just a few examples, may not be marketed without
agency approval. If agency decisions "to institute proceedings or to
promulgate rules" 203 were subject to the more forgiving standard of
review respondents seek in Massachusetts v. EPA, then agency actions
that decline to free up-rather than constrain-market behavior
would be subject to the same forgiving standard.
In declining to regulate greenhouse gases, EPA explained its refusal to act by noting that it preferred to take a different route from
the one laid out in section 202(a) (1) of the Clean Air Act. Nothing in
20 4
the "background principles of administrative law" EPA invokes
grants the agency the power to ignore statutes it does not like.
B.

Endangerment

The regulatory mandate of section 202 is triggered by a conclusion that motor vehicles cause or contribute to air pollution which
"may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 20 5 Endangerment is the only factor mentioned in section
202 (a) (1). Other provisions of section 202, which set forth the criteria
for the content of the regulations triggered by a determination of endangerment, specify additional factors for the agency to consider at
that stage. 20 6 Much of the Clean Air Act, in fact, takes the same basic
form: regulation is initially triggered by a finding of endangerment to
public health or welfare, and the content of regulation is shaped by
reference to numerous other factors. EPA was wrong to insert factors
beyond endangerment into the carefully circumscribed framework of
section 202 (a) (1).
The basic aim of the Act is "to protect and enhance the quality of
the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population. ' 20 7 Thus, the trigger for much of the regulatory action that occurs under the Act is the
endangerment of public health or welfare. For example, regulation of
stationary sources such as factories and power plants 208 and fuels and
fuel additives 20 9 is triggered by a conclusion that air pollution from
201.
202.

Id. § 355(a).
Id. § 360e (a).

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

U.S. Brief, supra note 15, at 36.
Id.at 39.
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
Id. § 7521 (a) (2), (3)(A).
Id. § 7401(b).
Id.§ 7411(b)(1)(A).
Id.§ 7545(c)(1).
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these sources "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare." Under the Act's regulatory programs, myriad other
factors (such as economic and technological feasibility) come into
play in implementation, 210 but the initial stimulus for regulatory action is health- and welfare-based.
Section 202 of the Act has the same structure. Section 202(a) (1)
creates the "trigger" for regulatory action on pollution from motor
vehicles. Section 202(a) (1) directs the Administrator's attention to
the question whether, "in his judgment," new motor vehicles or new
motor vehicle engines "cause, or contribute to, air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 2 1' The statute states that the Administrator "shall" regulate air
2 12
pollutants satisfying this criterion.
The other step in regulating air pollution from motor vehicles
involves deciding exactly what the regulatory standard for the pollutant(s) in question should be and when the standard should become
effective. The bulk of section 202 is concerned with these kinds of
questions. At that stage of regulatory decisionmaking, a range of factors beyond "endangerment" are relevant, including: the time needed
"to permit the development and application of the requisite technology"; taking compliance costs into account; 213 and the existence of
"an unreasonable risk to public health, welfare, or safety" due to the
"operation or function" of an emission control "device, system, or ele21 4
ment of design."
If any doubt remained as to whether Congress's singular focus on
endangerment in section 202(a) (1) was intentional, perusal of other
provisions in the Clean Air Act confirms that Congress carefully specified which factors are relevant, and which are not, to various agency
decisions under the Act. 215 In some cases, Congress explicitly allowed

the agency to range beyond specifically enumerated factors, by winding up a list of statutorily relevant factors with open-ended language
210. See, e.g., id. § 7411(a)(1).
211. Id. § 7521(a) (1).
212. Id.
213. Id. § 7521 (a) (2).
214. Id. § 7521(a) (4) (A).
id. § 7545(c) (2) (B) (stating the Administrator may not regulate fuel addi215. See, e.g.,
tive on account of its harm to vehicle emission control systems unless it first does costbenefit analysis of such regulation); id. § 7411 (a) (1), (b) (1) (stating that for certain categories of new sources, the Administrator must set "standards of performance," which take
into account cost and "any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy
requirements").
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such as "among other factors" 2t

or "and other relevant factors." 2 17
unstructured authority in section
6

Congress included no such
202(a) (1).
The Supreme Court has made plain that the courts' role in statutory interpretation begins, and often ends, with the statute's language. 2 18 In trying to discern a statute's meaning, the Court has found
it helpful-often decisive-to compare the language of the statutory
provision in question with language found elsewhere in the statute:
"Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
2 19
inclusion or exclusion."
These principles are a hallmark of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence under the Clean Air Act. Where Congress has listed certain factors as relevant in one part of the Act and not in another, the Court
has consistently respected this choice. For example, in Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass'ns, 220 the Court held that the absence of any
reference to costs in the provision specifying the criteria for
NAAQS, 22 t and the numerous references to costs in other provisions
of the Act, plainly precluded consideration of costs in setting the
22 3
NAAQS. 222 In so ruling, the Court relied on Union Electric Co. v. EPA
where the Court had similarly held that where Congress identifies the
factors an agency must consider in decisionmaking, the agency is not
2 24
free to stray and consider additional factors of its choosing.
216. See, e.g., id. § 7411(d)(2)(B), (j)(1)(A)(iv).
217. See, e.g., id. § 7412(a) (1), (f)(2)(A).
218. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,
108 (1980). Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist observed: "[T] he starting
point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as
conclusive." Id.
219. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong
Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
220. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
222. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 465-68.
223. 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
224. Id. at 256-66 (stating that EPA may not consider economic and technological
infeasibility in deciding whether to approve States' plans for implementing the NAAQS);
see alsoGen. Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 538 (1990) (holding that the fourmonth time limit for EPA review of an original state implementation plan did not apply to
plan revisions). In General Motors Corp., the Court observed, "Since the statutory language
does not expressly impose a 4-month deadline and Congress expressly included other
deadlines in the statute, it seems likely that Congress acted intentionally in omitting the 4month deadline" in the provision at issue. Id.
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In declining to regulate greenhouse gases, EPA strayed from this
well-marked path. The agency thought that it could decline to regulate emissions from new motor vehicles under section 202 (a) (1) by
invoking a melange of factors not mentioned in that provision. But an
administrative agency cannot rest its decisions "on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider." 225 The provision under which
EPA made its decision, section 202(a) (1) of the Act, is crystalline: EPA
is to decide whether to regulate an air pollutant emitted by motor
vehicles on the basis of its judgment as to whether public health or
welfare may reasonably be anticipated to be endangered by the pollution, not the hodgepodge of considerations EPA invoked in declining
to regulate greenhouse gases.
C.

"Different Policy Approach"

Even if section 202(a) (1) did not so plainly rule out consideration of factors other than endangerment in the initial decision
whether to regulate emissions from motor vehicles, the text and structure of the Clean Air Act make clear that three of the specific factors
EPA did consider are irrelevant under this provision. EPA could appropriately consider a fourth factor, scientific uncertainty, but the
agency failed to relate that factor to the statutory standard of
endangerment.
EPA expressed concern that regulation under section 202(a) (1)
would "result in an inefficient, piecemeal approach to addressing the
climate change issue." 22 6 Section 202(a) (1) itself, however, embraces
the very kind of approach EPA criticizes. It directs EPA to regulate
motor vehicle emissions that "cause, or contribute to" air pollution that
passes the endangerment threshold. 2 27 Congress used the same phrasing in directing EPA to set other standards under the Act. 228 Clearly,

the Act endorses incremental responses to air pollution problems,
rather than necessarily requiring all-encompassing solutions. EPA is
free to propose a comprehensive solution to the problem of climate

225. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983).
226. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,931 (Sept. 8, 2003).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
228. See, e.g., zd. § 7411(b) (1) (A) (stationary sources); § 7545(c)(1) (fuels and fuel
additives).
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change if it wishes to do so, but it is not free to reject the approach
Congress explicitly set forth in section 202(a) (1).229
The same observation applies to EPA's suggestion that reduction
of air pollutants associated with climate change in this country might
be offset by increases of such air pollutants in other countries, and
thus, "climate change raises important foreign policy issues" which "it
is the President's prerogative to address." 230 In enacting section
202 (a) (1), Congress was clearly aware that emissions from mobile
sources might not be the sole cause of an air pollution problem, yet it
directed EPA to regulate even when they "contribute to" such a problem. 23 1 In other provisions of the Act, moreover, Congress specifically
directed EPA to consider "emissions emanating from outside of the
United States" in making regulatory decisions. 2 32 Congress gave no
such direction to EPA in section 202(a) (1).
EPA also expressed concern that technologies might not be available to control air pollutants associated with climate change emitted
by motor vehicles. 233 This is, however, plainly not relevant to deciding
whether the endangerment standard of section 202(a) (1) is met. As
detailed in the previous section, the remainder of section 202 does
direct EPA's attention to the availability of technology, but only once
the agency has found endangerment.
The one factor mentioned by EPA that has anything to do -with
the endangerment standard of section 202(a) (1) is scientific uncertainty. However, as the lead opinion below expressly found, EPA did
229. In addition, as a factual matter, it is hard to credit EPA's characterization of the
approach it opposes as "piecemeal." Repeating the legal conclusion first announced in the
decision at issue here, EPA has also refused to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from
power plants and other stationary sources. Standards of Performance for Electric Utility
Steam Generating Units and Industrial-Commercial Steam Generating Units, 71 Fed. Reg.
9866, 9869 (Feb. 27, 2006) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2006)). Together, mobile sources
and power plants are responsible for more than sixty percent of the carbon dioxide emissions inventory in this country. See ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, EMissIONS OF
GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES 2004, at 24 (2005), available at http://www.eia.
doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/pdf/chapter2.pdf (describing carbon dioxide emissions of
transportation and electric power sectors).
230. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,931.
231. Tellingly, EPA has regulated mercury, a global pollutant, under the Act, despite
the possibility that domestic reductions will be offset by increased emissions elsewhere. See
Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2005) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 72, 75
(2005)).
232. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509a; see also § 7513(e).
233. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,931.
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not rely solely on uncertainty in coming to its decision. 234 Instead, it
relied on uncertainty in combination with the other factors clearly
having no relevance to the endangerment decision under section
202 (a) (1).235 The consideration of statutorily excluded factors taints
EPA's entire decision; we cannot know what EPA would have done if it
had exercised its judgment in light of the only legally relevant consideration-endangerment of public health or welfare-and the Court
23 6
cannot supply an answer EPA itself did not give.
Moreover, EPA failed to relate its discussion of scientific uncertainty to the statutory standard of endangerment. The existence of
uncertainty is not a bar to regulation or an excuse for inaction. An
agency cannot defer action "while it awaits the Godot of scientific certainty. ' 237 Congress underscored this point in 1977 by amending sec-

tion 202 (a) (1) (and other key regulatory provisions of the Act) to
require the Administrator to regulate emissions from motor vehicles
which "in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.

' 238

Previously, the Act had set regulation in motion based on the Administrator's judgment that any air pollutant from motor vehicles "causes
or contributes to, or is likely to cause or contribute to, air pollution
which endangers the public health or welfare." 2 39 The textual change,
from "endangers" to "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger,"
plainly signals that regulation of new motor vehicles is not to be es240
chewed merely because the relevant science is uncertain.
234. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir.
(2007).
235. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles
52,929-31.
236. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 93-95
237. Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Chao, 314
(quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d

2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1438
and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at

(1943).
F.3d 143, 156 (3d Cir. 2002)
1189, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
238. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 401, 91 Stat. 685, 791
(emphasis added); see also Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d
506, 514 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c) (1) (2000)).
239. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1690.
240. In Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), the court held that
the earlier endangerment standard authorized "regulatory action to prevent harm, even if
the regulator is less than certain that harm is otherwise inevitable." In 1977, Congress
amended section 202(a) (1) "to support the views expressed" in Ethyl. H.R. REP. No. 95-294,
at 49 (1977), as repnnted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1127. Specifically, "[i]n order to emphasize the precautionary or preventive purpose of the act (and, therefore, the Administrator's duty to assess risks rather than wait for proof of actual harm), the committee not only
retained the concept of endangerment to health; the committee also added the words
'may reasonably be anticipated.'" Id. at 51.
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EPA did not come close to applying this standard correctly in declining to regulate greenhouse gases. EPA did not seriously engage
with the scientific evidence indicating that the pollutants at issue here
are changing the earth's climate, causing destructive present effects
and laying the groundwork for even worse future ones. Instead, EPA
made do with a staccato listing of remaining uncertainties with respect
to climate change. 2 41 The centerpiece of its discussion was the 2001
National Research Council Report on climate change (issued after the
comment period closed), 242 from which EPA plucked the choicest
concessions to scientific uncertainty. Yet nowhere did EPA address the
overall thrust of the Report, which confirmed the scientific community's "current thinking" 24 3 that "most of the observed warming of the
last 50 years is likely to have been due to the increase in greenhouse
gas concentrations," 2 44 that the accumulation of greenhouse gases is
due to "human activities,' 245 and that "[d] espite the uncertainties,there
is general agreement that the observed warming is real and particu246
larly strong within the past 20 years."
Even with respect to the one factor relevant to determinations
under section 202 (a) (1), therefore, EPA blundered. Mere incantation
of the words "scientific uncertainty," paired with terse and selective
references to the state of the science, is not a substitute for the mature
scientific inquiry plainly contemplated by' section 202(a) (1).247
Whether air pollutants associated with climate change may be reasonably anticipated to endanger public health or welfare "is a matter for
the agency to decide, but it must bring its expertise to bear on the
241. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,930 (Sept. 8, 2003).
242. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 32, at 1.
243. Id. at 3.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1.
246. Id. at 3.
247. Of course, as Judge Tatel recognized, if scientific uncertainty was sufficient to prevent the Administrator from making a credible finding either of endangerment or nonendangerment, EPA could lawfully decline to regulate. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50,
75-76 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., dissenting) ("If the Administrator concludes based on
substantial evidence that more research is needed before he can judge whether GHGs may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger welfare, then he has discretion to hold off making a
finding.... In short, EPA may withhold an endangerment finding only if it needs more
information to determine whether the statutory standard has been met."), rev'd, 127 S. Ct.
1438 (2007). Here, however, the agency declined to regulate based on policy reasons; it
never claimed that scientific uncertainty prevented it from determining whether the endangerment threshold had been crossed. Id. at 77 ("EPA never suggests that the uncertainties identified by the NRC Report prevent it from determining that GHGs 'may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger' welfare.").
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question. '248 EPA's mistaken legal judgment about the requirements
of section 202(a) (1) led it far afield from this basic principle.

D.

"In His Judgment"

Section 202(a) (1)'s reference to the 'judgment" of the Administrator does two simple things: it specifies who is to make the determination regarding endangerment, and it makes clear that the
Administrator is expected to exercise his expertise on the issues of
environmental science and public health and welfare on which the
provision turns. From the statutory text, it is plain that the 'judgment"
Congress called upon relates only to the Administrator's determination whether a given pollutant causes or contributes to pollution that
endangers the public health or welfare. What the word 'judgment"
does not do is allow EPA to smuggle into this provision factors otherwise left out of it. To decide that allowance for 'judgment" on the part
of the Administrator-a feature present throughout the Clean Air
Act, as well as in untold numbers of provisions in the United States
Code-gives the Administrator unfettered discretion to regulate or
not, as he sees fit and without regard to statutory text, would be to
effect a radical transfer of authority from Congress to the executive
branch.
Section 202(a) (1) provides:
The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from
time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from
any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle
engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may 2reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public
49
health or welfare.
In its brief treatment of this statutory language, EPA concedes
that this language means that once the agency has made a finding that
emissions from new motor vehicles contribute to air pollution which
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,
EPA must regulate those emissions. 250 But section 202 (a) (1) places,
in EPA's view, absolutely no constraint on the agency's decision
2 51
whether to make such a determination in the first place.
248. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 54 (1983).
249. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
250. U.S. Brief, supra note 15, at 41-42.
251. Id. at 40-41.
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EPA believes that the phrase "in his judgment" justifies the latter
conclusion:
Nothing in Section 202(a) (1) ... requires EPA to make [an endangerment] determination at any particular time. To the contrary,
the provision emphasizes the Administrator's ability to exercise his
"judgment," which presumably includes the judgment that this issue is not yet ripe for determination. Thus, absent a formal judgment by the Administrator that greenhouse gas emissions from
new motor vehicles can be expected to cause endangerment, the
the
agency retained its traditional flexibility to base its denial of 252
rulemaking petition on a broad range of discretionary factors.
EPA's interpretation and its presumption about the scope of the
Administrator's discretion are wrong for several reasons.
"[I] n his judgment" modifies only the phrase "cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare." It does not modify the word "shall" or grant
wholesale discretion over the question whether to regulate emissions
from motor vehicles. But that is how EPA reads the phrase. In EPA's
view, "in his judgment" smuggles even a blatant disagreement with the
policy of section 202(a) (1) into section 202(a) (1) itself, as a "discretionary factor" the agency is entitled to consider. Only thus could EPA
argue that its characterization of section 202 (a) (1) as an "inefficient,
piecemeal" answer to the question before it helped tojustify its refusal
to regulate under that provision. 253 An agency cannot, however, defend a decision based on its own preference for a policy approach
254
different from the one Congress chose.
Moreover, EPA's interpretation ascribes a very strange intent to
Congress. According to EPA, Congress thought that emissions that
contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare are such a big problem that EPA must
regulate them. But, at the same time, Congress gave EPA absolute discretion as to whether to make the determination on which regulation
could be based. On EPA's theory, the agency could have right in front
of its eyes conclusive evidence that climate change (for example) is
causing and will, for the indefinite future, continue to cause an environmental catastrophe, and so long as it did not take a close look at
that evidence, it would have absolutely no obligation to do anything to
mitigate the threat. EPA's interpretation does violence not only to the
252. Id. at 41.
253. Id. at 48.
254. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) (stating that an agency may not rely "on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider").
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text of section 202(a) (1) and to its basic sense, but also to an animating theme of the Clean Air Act itself-that as scientific knowledge advances, it should be pressed into service in protecting the public from
threats to its health and welfare.
Acceptance of EPA's position would also pay insufficient respect
to Congress's choice, in section 202, of technology-based standards
over the health-based standards found elsewhere in the Act. 255 Tech-

nology-based standards demand much less intensive examination of
the precise health and environmental consequences of pollution than
health-based standards do. Requiring highly specific areas of scientific
uncertainty to be resolved before regulating, as EPA has done, misapprehends the nature of the regulatory instrument Congress chose in
enacting section 202.
Finally, EPA's interpretation gets the standard of scientific proof
embodied in section 202(a) (1) just backwards. EPA interprets the
phrase "in his judgment" to give the Administrator complete control
over the determination of when the issue of endangerment "is ... ripe
for determination."' 2 56 Congress, however, included the phrase "may
reasonably be anticipated" precisely in order to make clear that EPA
need not, and should not, wait for all scientific uncertainties to be
resolved before taking action against an environmental threat.
Citing Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 257 the Solicitor General has argued to
the Court that "[t] he fact that EPA may regulate in the face of uncertainty . . . does not preclude the agency from deferring regulation

pending the acquisition of additional information." 258 This argument
badly misconceives the decision in Ethyl, which Congress ratified in
amending the endangerment standard of section 202 (a) (1) in
1977.259 The court in Ethyl concluded that the agency's discretion was
not only enlarged by the endangerment standard then in existence
(because the standard permitted regulation in the face of uncertainty), but was constrained by it as well:
255. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (2000).
256. U.S. Brief, supra note 15, at 41; see also id. at 44 ("EPA may properly defer making
an endangerment determination while it waits for additional scientific and technical studies to be completed."); id. at 45 (referring to "the agency's view that any decision whether
to regulate in this area would be better made after further research was conducted into
critical areas of current scientific uncertainty").
257. 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
258. U.S. Brief, supra note 15, at 47 n.23.
259. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 401(d) (1), 91 Stat. 685,
791; H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 49 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1127.
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A statute allowing for regulation in the face of danger is, necessarily, a precautionary statute. Regulatory action may be taken before
the threatened harm occurs; indeed, the very existence of such
precautionary legislation would seem to demand that regulatory action precede, and, optimally, prevent, the perceived threat.... We
believe the precautionary language of the Act indicates quite
plainly Congress' intent that regulation should precede any
threatened, albeit unprecedented, disaster. .

.

. [T]he statutes-

and common sense-demand regulatory action to prevent harm,
regulator is less than certain that the harm is otherwise
even if the260
inevitable.
Under section 202(a) (1), as amended to embody the Ethyl decision, the Administrator may not, as happened here, just wave a hand
in the direction of scientific uncertainty in explaining a failure to act
against a large-scale risk. There is always uncertainty in environmental
matters, and, especially given the Clean Air Act's promotion of scientific research, there will always be "additional scientific and technical
studies" 26 1 awaiting completion. Acceptance of EPA's claim of the
scope of its own discretion under section 202(a) (1) would render the
precautionary aspect of that provision a nullity.
The conclusion that the phrase "in his judgment" does not give
the agency freewheeling discretion is bolstered by consulting the
many other provisions in the Clean Air Act that use this same phrase.
In numerous instances, the Act includes the phrase "in his judgment"
(or "in the Administrator's judgment") when it directs the Administrator to make a scientific determination that is a condition precedent to
regulation or other administrative action. 262 Congress's use of the
phrase "in his judgment" in so many critical provisions of the Act
shows the danger in the radical interpretation of that term endorsed
by the lead opinion in the D.C. Circuit. If mere reference to the 'judgment" of the Administrator gives the agency license not to regulateor to regulate-based on the Administrator's undisciplined sense of
whether it "makes sense to regulate," 263 then many of the Act's most
important provisions become blank canvases for the Administrator to
260. 541 F.2d at 13, 13 & n.18, 25.
261. U.S. Brief, supra note 15, at 44.
262. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (2000) (listing criteria pollutants),
§ 7409(b) (1)-(2) (setting primary and secondary NAAQS); § 7411 (b) (1) (A) (listing stationary sources subject to New Source Performance Standards ("NSPS")); § 7411(h) (1) (setting NSPS); § 7412(h)(1) (setting standards for hazardous air pollutants); § 7545(c)(1)
(regulating fuels and fuel additives); § 7547(a) (3)-(4) (setting standards for non-road engines and vehicles); § 7671n (regulating ozone-depleting substances).
263. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,929 (Sept. 8, 2003).
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paint as the Administrator wishes. This is not what the statute says, and
it is not consistent with the Court's continued admonitions that statutes must give some direction to agencies about how they are to im2 64
plement the statutes they are charged with administering.
IV.

Conclusion

The statutory framework governing Massachusetts v. EPA is
straightforward. Physical or chemical matter that is emitted into the
ambient air is an "air pollutant" under the Clean Air Act.2 65 The Administrator of the EPA "shall" set standards for air pollutants emitted
by new motor vehicles when, in the Administrator's judgment, they
"cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 26 6 "Climate" and
"weather" are components of "welfare." 267
Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons are physical and chemical matter. They are emitted into the
ambient air by motor vehicles. A prodigious amount of scientific evidence indicates that they are changing our climate. Several parties
asked EPA to regulate these chemicals under section 202 (a) (1) of the
Act because they are "air pollutants" that "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health and welfare."
EPA's denial of the petition rested on two fundamental errors of
law. First, EPA concluded that it had no authority under section
202 (a) (1) to regulate air pollutants associated with climate change
and that therefore the chemicals at issue here are not "air pollutants"
within the meaning of the Act. Second, the agency decided that even
if it had such authority, it would not exercise it, on account of various
ad hoc policy considerations not enumerated in section 202(a) (1).
The same mistake dooms both legal conclusions-EPA distorted two
statutory terms ("air pollutant" and 'Judgment") and ignored a third
("welfare") in order to inject its own policy preferences into a statute
that does not embody them.
EPA's misguided legal conclusions diverted it from the serious
scientific inquiry at the heart of section 202(a) (1). Section 202(a) (1)
requires the Administrator to set standards for air pollutants emitted
by new motor vehicles "which in his judgment cause, or contribute to,
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
264.
265.
266.
267.

Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001).
42 U.S.C. § 7 602(g).
Id. § 7521 (a)(]).
Id. § 7602(h).
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health or welfare. '268 EPA did not apply that standard, and it denied
the petition without deciding whether carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons may, due to their effects on climate, reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.
To the extent the agency mentioned the science of climate change at
all, it provided little more than a bullet-point list of scientific issues
that remain incompletely resolved.
Petitioners in Massachusetts v. EPA are asking the Supreme Court
to correct EPA's legal errors and to remand the case to the agency
with directions to apply the correct legal standard to that matter; that
is all. A judgment in favor of petitioners will not mandate regulation
of air pollutants associated with climate change, nor will it dictate a
particular answer to the question whether such pollutants are endangering public health or welfare. It will, however, ensure that the question whether to regulate these pollutants is evaluated according to the
legal standard set forth in the Clean Air Act.

268.

Id. § 7521 (a) (1).
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